Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies by Gomez-Gardenes, J. et al.
ar
X
iv
:p
hy
sic
s/0
61
21
08
v3
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  8
 M
ar 
20
07
[Physical Review Letters 98, 108103 (2007)]
Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies
J. Go´mez-Garden˜es,1,2 M. Campillo,2 L. M. Florı´a,1, 2 and Y. Moreno1, ∗
1Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems (BIFI), University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza 50009, Spain
2Departamento de Fı´sica de la Materia Condensada, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza E-50009, Spain
(Dated: August 8, 2018)
In this Letter, we study how cooperation is organized in complex topologies by analyzing the evolutionary
(replicator) dynamics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a two-players game with two available strategies, defection and
cooperation, whose payoff matrix favors defection. We show that, asymptotically, the population is partitioned
into three subsets: individuals that always cooperate (pure cooperators), always defect (pure defectors) and
those that intermittently change their strategy. In fact the size of the latter set is the biggest for a wide range of
the ”stimulus to defect” parameter. While in homogeneous random graphs pure cooperators are grouped into
several clusters, in heterogeneous scale-free (SF) networks they always form a single cluster containing the most
connected individuals (hubs). Our results give further insights into why cooperation in SF networks is favored.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le, 89.75.Fb
To understand the observed survival of cooperation among
unrelated individuals in social communities when selfish ac-
tions provide a higher benefit, a lot of attention is being paid to
the analysis of evolutionary dynamics of simple two-players
games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). In this game indi-
viduals adopt one of the two available strategies, coopera-
tion or defection; both receive R under mutual cooperation
and P under mutual defection, while a cooperator receives
S when confronted to a defector, which in turn receives T ,
where T > R > P > S. Under these conditions it is better to
defect, regardless of the opponent strategy, and assuming that
strategies are allowed to spread within the population accord-
ing to their payoffs (replicator dynamics [1, 2]), the proportion
of cooperators asymptotically vanishes in a well-mixed popu-
lation (i.e. when each agent interacts with all other agents).
If the well-mixed population hypothesis is abandoned, so
that individuals only interact with their neighbors in a social
network, several studies [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] have reported the
asymptotic survival of cooperation on different types of net-
works. Notably, cooperation even dominates over defection in
heterogeneous, SF networks where the distribution density of
local connectivities follows a power law. In view of the accu-
mulated evidence [10, 11] that many social (as well as tech-
nological, biological and other) networks are highly heteroge-
neous, these results are highly relevant for the understanding
of the evolution of cooperation.
In this Letter, we are interested in exploring the roots of the
diverse behavior observed on top of different complex topolo-
gies and in providing an explanation in terms of microscopic
arguments. We have analyzed in detail the microscopic struc-
tural aspects underlying the differences in the evolution of
cooperation in a one-parameter family of networks interpo-
lating between Baraba´si-Albert (BA) [12] and Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
(ER) graphs. As usual in recent studies [3, 4], we choose
the Prisoner’s Dilemma payoffs as R = 1, P = S = 0, and
T = b > 1, and implement the finite population analogue of
replicator dynamics [4]. At each time step t, which represents
one generation of the discrete evolutionary time, each node i
in the network plays with all its neighbors and accumulates
the obtained payoffs, Pi. Then, the individuals, i, update syn-
chronously their strategies by picking up at random a neigh-
bor, j, and comparing their respective payoffs Pi and Pj . If
Pi > Pj , nothing happens and i keeps the same strategy for
the next generation. On the contrary, if Pj > Pi, with proba-
bility Πi→j = (Pj − Pi)/max{ki, kj}b, i adopts the strategy
of j for the next round robin with its neighbors [4].
We have performed simulations for a population of N in-
dividuals that interact following the couplings dictated by the
underlying graph. To explore the structure and dynamics of
cooperative behavior in different topologies, we have made
use of the model developed in [13], which allows to smoothly
pass from a BA network to a random graph of the sort of ER
networks by tuning a single parameter α ∈ (0, 1). We will
restrict hereafter to these two limiting cases (ER, α = 1, and
BA, α = 0). The results obtained for other values of α will be
discussed elsewhere [14]. We advance that they are consistent
with the picture described in what follows.
The dynamics is implemented once the network is grown.
At the beginning, each individual of the population has the
same probability of adopting either of the two available strate-
gies: cooperation (si = 1) or defection (si = 0). We let the
system evolve for 5000 generations and check whether or not
the system has reached a stationary state as given by the frac-
tion, c(t), of individuals that are cooperators. We impose that
this magnitude is in equilibrium when, taken over a time win-
dow of 103 additional generations, the slope of c(t) is smaller
than 10−2 [15]. After such a defined transient time t0, we
let the system evolve again for 104 additional time steps, and
measure the magnitudes whose behavior is described in the
following. All simulations presented hereafter have been car-
ried out for networks made up of 4000 nodes with 〈k〉 = 4 and
results are averaged over at least 103 different realizations of
the networks and initial conditions [16].
The above procedure allows to scrutinize in depth the mi-
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FIG. 1: (color online) Fraction (referred to the total number of in-
dividuals of the population) of pure and fluctuating strategies as a
function of b. 〈c〉 (black continuous line) represents the asymp-
totic expected fraction of cooperators at each generation. The border
lines separating colored regions correspond to ρc(b) (red-green) and
1 − ρd(b) (green-blue). Networks are made up of 4000 nodes and
〈k〉 = 4. The exponent of the SF network is −3.
croscopic temporal evolution of cooperation as well as to char-
acterize how its local patterns are formed. Individuals’ strate-
gies asymptotically (i.e. t > t0) follow three different behav-
iors. Let P (x, t) be the probability that an individual adopts
the strategy x at any time t > t0. We say that an element i of
the population is pure cooperator if P (si = 1, t) = 1, i.e., it
plays as cooperator in all generations after the transient time.
Conversely, pure defectors, are those individuals for which
P (si = 0, t) = 1. A third class is constituted by fluctuat-
ing individuals, that is, those elements that alternatively spend
some time as cooperators and some time as defectors.
Figure 1 shows the densities of the three classes of play-
ers as b is increased, for the two limiting cases of ER (up-
per) and SF networks (bottom). Note that the fraction of pure
cooperators (ρc, continuous leftmost line) is always equal or
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FIG. 2: Fraction of fluctuating strategies as a function of the density
of pure cooperators. The solid line is ρf = 1− ρc. Deviations from
it means that pure defectors have come into play. Note that the same
value of ρc in both topologies corresponds, in general, to different
values of b. Networks parameters are those used in Fig. 1.
smaller than the density 〈c〉(b), which is the asymptotic ex-
pected value of the fraction of cooperators. This indicates that
the density of cooperators is, on average, stationary, but not
frozen as a significant fraction of individuals are still able to
intermittently adopt different strategies. It is observed that in
a small range of b > 1, ρc = 〈c〉(b) for the ER network, while
the equality does not hold for any value of b when the under-
lying architecture is a SF network. Looking only at pure co-
operation, there is a crossover for moderate values of b. From
that point on, the level of pure cooperators in SF networks is
above that in ER graphs. Additionally, the decay of ρc(b) is
abrupt for homogeneous networks and more smooth for SF
ones. Therefore, pure cooperators are more robust to varia-
tions of b in these latter topologies.
Furthermore, there is a region of b in which almost all
strategies are fluctuating for the ER graph while this is not the
case for heterogeneous networks. This feature is illustrated
in Fig. 2, where it is represented the fraction of fluctuating
strategists, ρf , as a function of ρc. The deviation from the
continuous line, which is the function ρf = 1− ρc, marks the
appearance of pure defectors. For both networks, the density
of fluctuating elements raises when ρc decreases, however, the
decay of ρf is clearly differentiated. While for the SF net-
work this magnitude falls smoothly and well below 1, for the
ER network the fraction ρf continues to increase almost to
1, and then decreases suddenly, roughly keeping ρc constant.
Moreover, the number of pure cooperators relative to the total
number of elements of the population is significantly smaller
in the ER networks than in the SF case.
Figure 2 gives even more information about what is go-
ing on at a microscopic scale. Why does the fraction ρc is
smaller in ER than in SF networks? An important clue comes
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FIG. 3: Number of clusters of pure cooperators (upper panel) and
pure defectors (bottom panel) as a function of 1− ρc and ρd in order
to have both x axes growing in the same way as b does. The figures
clearly show that it is possible to have more than one cooperator clus-
ter only for the ER network, while pure defectors are always spread
into several cores in SF networks and form a single cluster only in
homogeneous structures. Network parameters are those of Fig. 1.
from the analysis of the local distribution of pure coopera-
tors. Let us first define the concept of cluster or core. A
cooperator core (CC) is a connected component (subgraph)
fully and permanently occupied by cooperator strategy si = 1,
i.e., by pure cooperators so that P (si(t) 6= 1, ∀t > t0) = 0,
∀i ∈ CC. Analogously, a defector core (DC) is the subgraph
whose elements are pure defectors, namely, when the condi-
tion P (si(t) 6= 0, ∀t > t0) = 0, ∀i ∈ DC is fulfilled. It is
easy to see that a CC cannot be in direct contact with a DC,
but with a cloud of fluctuating elements that constitutes the
frontier between these two cores. Note that a CC is stable if
none of its elements has a defector neighbor coupled to more
than kc/b cooperators where kc is the number of cooperators
linked to the element. Thus, the stability of a CC is clearly
enhanced by a high number of connections among pure coop-
erators, which implies abundance of cycles in the CC.
 1
 0.8
 0.6
 0.4
 0.2
 0
 1  1.5  2  2.5  3
N
cf
b
ER
SF
FIG. 4: Fraction of pure cooperators that share at least a link with
fluctuating strategists as a function of b. The high values of Ncf for
ER networks is influenced by the existence of several CC. This not
the case for the SF network where there is only one CC and Ncf is
much smaller. See the text for further details.
This microscopic structure of clusters is at the root of the
differences found in the levels of cooperation for both net-
works and nicely explains why cooperative behavior is more
successful in SF networks than in homogeneous graphs. In
fact, as far as loops are concerned, the main difference be-
tween the two topologies is that the number of small cycles of
lengthL, NL, are given by [17, 18] (log(N))L and (〈k〉−1)L,
respectively. Therefore, it is more likely that SF networks de-
velop a CC than ER ones. This has been tested numerically
by looking at the probability that at least one cooperator core
exists. The results [14] indicate that this probability remains 1
for SF networks even for b > 2 and that it approaches zero for
large b following a sort of second order phase transition. On
the contrary, for ER networks, the same probability departs
from 1 at an intermediate value of b and shows a sudden jump
to 0 at b = 2, reminiscent of a first order like phase transition.
We next focus on the detailed characterization of CC and
DC structures. Fig. 3 shows the number of clusters made
up of pure cooperators (Ncc, upper panel) and pure defectors
(Ndc, bottom panel) for both topologies as a function of 1−ρc
and ρd, respectively (recall that 1 − ρc grows as b increases).
The first noticeable result concerns the number of coopera-
tor cores. While for ER networks Ncc is equal to 1 only for
a small range of ρc values, and later increases up to a maxi-
mum, for the SF network the number of such cores is always
1, no matter the value of ρc. That is to say, in one topology
(ER), there is a wide region of b where there are several coop-
erator cores, whereas pure cooperators in SF networks always
form a single core. On the other hand, the behavior of Ncc
in SF graphs implies that the cycles discussed above are inter-
connected, giving rise to more complex structures. We have
also verified that the cooperator core in SF networks contains
the hubs, which are the ones that stick together the cooperator
cycles that would otherwise be disconnected [19].
4Looking again at Fig. 3, one realizes that there are also
radical differences in the local organization of pure defectors.
Again, the structural patterns in both networks can be clearly
distinguished. In ER networks, pure defectors first appear dis-
tributed in several clusters that later coalesce to form a single
core for values of b < 2, i.e., before the whole system is in-
vaded by defectors. Conversely, defectors are always orga-
nized in several clusters for SF networks (except when they
occupy the whole system). This latter behavior results from
the role hubs play [4]. As they are the most robust against
defector’s invasion, highly connected individuals survive as
pure cooperators until the fraction ρc vanishes (see also Fig.
2), thus keeping around them a highly robust cooperator core
that loses more and more elements of its outer layer until co-
operation is finally defeated by defection.
The picture emerging from the analyses performed clearly
indicates that two different paths characterize the raising (or
breakdown) of cooperation. This is also reflected in the way
pure cooperators are invaded by defector strategists. Starting
at b = 1 all individuals in both topologies are playing as pure
cooperators. However, for b > 1, the pure cooperative level
drops below 1 and the population is constituted by pure coop-
erators as well as by a cloud of fluctuating individuals. When
b is further increased, these fluctuating elements, that consti-
tute the physical frontier of CC clusters, start to spend more
and more time as defectors exploiting cooperators, which ul-
timately leads to the invasion of the pure cooperators. In this
regard, the fragility of a CC cluster mainly depends on how
the cluster’s elements are exposed to their frontier. Figure 4
shows the ”effective surface” of CC as given by the fraction
of pure cooperators, Ncf , that share at least a link with fluc-
tuating players as a function of b. It is clear from the figure
that in ER networks the invasion is faster than in SF graphs,
with a sudden increase of Ncf at low values of b, signaling the
abrupt decay observed in Fig. 1. This is due to the fragmen-
tation of pure cooperators into several CC that are in a flood
of fluctuating elements, which eventually leaves pure cooper-
ators more exposed to invasion. Conversely, in SF networks,
the existence of only one CC makes it more resilient to defec-
tion since in this case the number of pure cooperators exposed
to fluctuating individuals is much lower, as indicated by Ncf .
Hence, the internal cohesion of the CC cluster sustains coop-
eration for larger values of b until an N -defector core comes
out. In summary, we have shown that there are three different
classes of individuals according to their asymptotic strategies
and that two different patterns of cooperative behavior, deter-
mined by the underlying structure, can be clearly identified.
Specifically, our results unveil that in SF networks pure coop-
erators always form a unique cooperator core while several de-
fector clusters coexist. On the contrary, for ER networks, both
pure and defector strategists are grouped into several clusters.
The microscopic organization of asymptotic cooperation on
the evolutionary dynamics of different games, like e.g. Snow-
drift, Stag-Hunt [5], can obviously differ from the PD game.
However, one should expect that the partition of the popula-
tion into fluctuating and pure strategists will also generically
hold. Finally, we note that the same structural differences in
the emergence and evolution of cooperation has been pointed
out in synchronization phenomena on top of complex topolo-
gies [20]. Whether or not these common evolutionary patterns
that emerge in two distinct phenomena are relevant to explain
the ubiquitous presence of SF networks in Nature is still to be
tested on more firm grounds. Studies of cooperation on real
social networks, like e.g. [21] may help to scale up to a meso-
scopic description (in terms of communities) the observations
and results presented here.
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